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Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete
information: the dependent case
Fabien Gensbittel∗, Miquel Oliu-Barton †
Abstract. Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (1996a, 1996b), De Meyer
and Marino (2005) provided optimal strategies for both players in finitely repeated games with
incomplete information on two sides, in the independent case. In this note, we extend both
the duality techniques and the construction of optimal strategies to the case of general type
dependence.
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1 Introduction
We consider here a zero-sum repeated game with incomplete information on both sides, in the
spirit of Aumann and Maschler [1]. Let K (resp. L) be the finite set of types of Player 1
(resp. 2), and let π be a probability distribution over K × L. To any pair (k, ℓ) corresponds
a matrix game Gkℓ : I × J → R, where I (resp. J) is the finite set of actions of Player 1
(resp. 2). The game is played as follows. First, a pair (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L is drawn according to
π. Player 1 (resp. 2) is informed only of k (resp. ℓ). Then, the game Gkℓ is played repeatedly.
At each stage m ≥ 1, the players choose actions (im, jm) ∈ I × J and produce a stage-payoff
Gkℓ(im, jm) for Player 1. Actions are publicly observed after each stage. To the realized stream
of payoffs (Gkℓ(im, jm))m≥1, we associate the θ-weighted sum
∑
m≥1 θmG
kℓ(im, jm) where θ is a
probability over the set of positive integers specifying the weight of each stage. For any initial
distribution π and evaluation θ, we consider the game Gθ(π) where the payoff of Player 1 is the
expected θ-weighted sum of the stage-payoffs. Particular choices of θ lead to the usual n-stage
and λ-discounted games. The game has a value denoted vθ(π) (see e.g. Lemma 3.2 below).
This model was analyzed by Mertens and Zamir in [8]. Their main result was the existence
of a limit value for the n-stage repeated games as n goes to +∞ and its characterization as
the unique solution of a system of functional equations. The proof of this result was based on
the introduction of specific notion of concavity, called I-concavity, for the value function vn.
Precisely, any probability π can be decomposed as a pair (p,Q) where p is a probability over
K and Q is a transition probability from K to L. Then, one may consider vθ as a function of
(p,Q) and this function is concave with respect to p. A dual notion of II-convexity was also
introduced and the notions of I-concave and II-convex envelopes were the building blocks of the
system of functional equations characterizing the limit value. Based on this characterization, a
construction of asymptotically optimal strategies (i.e. strategies being almost optimal in Gθ(π),
with an error term vanishing as the weights of each stage tend to 0) was obtained by Heuer [7]
for n-stage games.
In addition to their main result, Mertens and Zamir [8] also established a recursive formula
for vθ. However, the formula does not allow in general to construct recursively optimal strategies
for the players, except in the case of incomplete information on one side (i.e. when L is reduced
to one point), where it can be used to construct optimal strategies for the informed player only.
The notion of dual game was introduced by De Meyer in [4, 5] in order to provide a recursive
construction of optimal strategies for the uninformed player in the case of games with incomplete
information on one side. In contrast with the result of Heuer, the construction of De Meyer leads
to optimal strategies in a game with fixed length and is not an asymptotic result. These duality
techniques were later extended by De Meyer and Marino [6] for repeated games with incomplete
information on both sides, in the special case of independent initial probabilities, i.e. π = p⊗ q,
for some probabilities p on K and q on L.
The construction of the dual game given in [6] for the independent case is related to the
Fenchel conjugate of the function p→ vθ(p⊗ q) for some fixed probability q on L. In this note,
using the notion of I-concavity and II-convexity, we extend the construction of the dual game for
general, possibly dependent, initial probabilities π, by considering the notion of Fenchel conju-
gate of I-concave and II-convex functions. The same approach was taken by the second author in
[9] to prove the existence and give a characterization of the value function for differential games
with incomplete information. Our main result here is a recursive formula for the value function
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of the dual game from which we deduce a recursive manner to construct optimal strategies in
the game Gθ(π).
The most surprising aspect of this result is the need of adding an extra weight parameter to
the dual game in order to obtain a recursive formula, which contrasts with the analogue results
in the independent case [6].
2 Duality techniques
In this section, we will start by briefly recalling the construction and some results of [11, Chapter
2] for games with incomplete information on one side. Next, we establish analogue results for
games with incomplete information on both sides. In all the games introduced below (primal
and dual games), the model is known by both players and player 1 maximizes.
Notation 2.1. For a non-empty finite set X, ∆(X) denotes the set of probabilities over X, and
is identified with the canonical simplex in RX . N∗ denotes the set of positive integers.
2.1 Incomplete information on one side
Let K be a finite set of parameters and let S and T be two convex sets of actions. For any
k ∈ K, let Gk : S × T → R be the payoff function of a normal-form game. Assume that Gk is
bi-linear for all k and that ‖G‖ := supk,s,t |G
k(s, t)| <∞.
2.1.1 The primal game G(p)
For any p ∈ ∆(K), one defines a game of incomplete information on one side, denoted by G(p),
as follows:
• Before the play, k ∈ K is chosen according to p and told to player 1.
• Then, the game Gk is played, i.e. player 1 (resp. 2) chooses s ∈ S (resp. t ∈ T ).
The set of strategies of player 1 (resp. 2) is SK (resp. T ). For any (sˆ, t) ∈ SK × T , the payoff
is given by
γ(p, sˆ, t) :=
∑
k∈K
pkGk(sˆk, t).
Let v−(p) and v+(p) denote, respectively, the maxmin and minmax of G(p), i.e.
v−(p) := sup
sˆ∈SK
inf
t∈T
γ(p, sˆ, t),
v+(p) := inf
t∈T
sup
sˆ∈SK
γ(p, sˆ, t).
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2.1.2 The dual game D[G](x)
To each x ∈ RK , corresponds the dual game D[G](x), a modified version of the game where
player 1 can choose the parameter k ∈ K with some cost xk. Formally, the set of strategies of
player 1 (resp. 2) is ∆(K)× S (resp. T ). For any (p, s) and t, the payoff is given by
h[x](p, s, t) :=
∑
k∈K
pkGk(s, t)− 〈p, x〉.
Let w−(p) and w+(p) denote, respectively, the maxmin and minmax of D[G](x), i.e.
w−(p) := sup
(p,s)∈∆(K)×S
inf
t∈T
h[x](p, s, t),
w+(p) := inf
t∈T
sup
(p,s)∈∆(K)×S
h[x](p, s, t).
2.1.3 Duality results
Let v+(p), v−(p) and w+(x), w−(x) be the minmax and maxmin of G(p) and D[G](x), respec-
tively, for any p ∈ ∆(K) and x ∈ RK . Then, essentially, v+ and w+ (resp. v− and w−) are
Fenchel conjugates to each other (see [4, 5]). An important consequence of these relations is that
ε-optimal strategies for player 2 in D[G](x) are also ε-optimal for him in G(p), for an appropriate
choice of (p, x).
Start by defining two transforms which are closely related to the Fenchel operator, yet more
adapted to this framework.
Definition 2.2. Let f : RK → R. Define its upper and lower conjugates f ♯, f ♭ : RK → R by:
f ♯(x) := sup
y∈RK
f(y)− 〈y, x〉,
f ♭(y) := inf
x∈RK
f(x) + 〈x, y〉.
Recall that the Fenchel conjugate of f is given by f∗(x) = supy∈RK 〈y, x〉 − f(y). Thus,
f ♯(x) = (−f)∗(−x), and f ♭(y) = −f∗(−y), ∀x, y ∈ RK .
Define the superdifferential of f at x as usual:
∂+f(x) := {y ∈ RK | f(x) + 〈y, x′ − x〉 ≥ f(x′), ∀x′ ∈ RK}.
Notation 2.3. Without further mention, the upper and lower value functions, defined on ∆(K),
are extended to RK by −∞ in RK\∆(K).
We refer to [11, Chapter 2] for the following results.
Theorem. The map v+ : ∆(K) → R is concave and ‖G‖-Lipschitz continuous. Moreover, for
all p ∈ ∆(K) and x ∈ RK ,
w+(x) = (v+)♯(x), and v+(p) = (w+)♭(p).
w−(x) = (v−)♯(x), and v−(p) = (w−)♭(p).
Corollary. Given p ∈ ∆(K), let x ∈ ∂+v+(p), and let tε ∈ T be an ε-optimal strategy of player
2 in D[G](x). Then, tε is ε-optimal for player 2 in G(p).
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2.2 Incomplete information on two sides
Let K and L be two finite set of parameters and let S and T be two convex sets of actions. For
any (k, ℓ) ∈ K ×L, let Gkℓ : S × T → R be the payoff function of a normal-form game. Assume
that Gkℓ is bi-linear for all (k, ℓ) and that ‖G‖ := supk,s,t |G
k(s, t)| <∞.
2.2.1 The primal game G(π)
For any π ∈ ∆(K ×L), define a game of incomplete information on two sides, denoted by G(π),
as follows:
• Before the play, (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L is chosen according to π. Player 1 (resp. 2) is informed of
k (resp. ℓ).
• Then, the game Gkℓ is played, i.e. Player 1 chooses s ∈ S, player 2 chooses t ∈ T and the
payoff is Gkℓ(s, t).
The set of strategies of player 1 (resp. 2) is SK (resp. TL). For any (sˆ, tˆ) ∈ SK × TL, the
payoff is given by
γ(π, sˆ, tˆ) :=
∑
(k,ℓ)∈K×L
πkℓGkℓ(sˆk, tˆℓ).
Let v−(π) (resp. v+(π)) be the maxmin (resp. minmax) of G(π).
Remark 2.4. Incomplete information on one side corresponds to the case |L| = 1.
In order to apply the duality techniques mentioned above, it is convenient to give an equivalent
formulation of the primal game. The idea is to use the duality operator with respect to the first
marginal of π.
2.2.2 The intermediate game GQ(p)
Let Q ∈ ∆(L)K be a fixed matrix of conditional probabilities, i.e. for all k ∈ K, Q( · | k) is a
probability distribution on L. For each k ∈ K, define the game GkQ as follows:
• Before the play, ℓ ∈ L is chosen according to Q( · | k) ∈ ∆(L) and told to player 2.
• Then, the game Gkℓ is played. Player 1 (resp. 2) chooses s ∈ S (resp. t ∈ T ) and the
payoff is Gkℓ(s, t).
The set of strategies of player 1 (resp. 2) is S (resp. TL). For any (s, tˆ) ∈ S × TL, the payoff
is given by
GkQ(s, tˆ) :=
∑
ℓ∈L
Q(ℓ|k)Gkℓ(s, tˆℓ).
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Note that GkQ is bi-linear for all k ∈ K and that supk,s,tˆ |G
k
Q(s, tˆ)| ≤ ‖G‖ < ∞. Besides, T
L
is a convex set. Hence, (S, TL, {GkQ, k ∈ K}) satisfies the assumptions of Section 2.1. For any
p ∈ ∆(K), define the game GQ(p) as in Section 2.1.1.
2.2.3 Duality results: extension to the general case
Let v+Q(p) be the minmax of GQ(p), for any p ∈ ∆(K). As in Section 2.1.2 define, for any
x ∈ RK , the dual game D[GQ](x), and let w
+
Q(x) denote its minmax. Then the following result
holds.
Theorem 2.5. For all Q ∈ ∆(L)K , the maps v+Q : ∆(K) → R is concave and ‖G‖-Lipschitz
continuous. Moreover, for any p ∈ ∆(K) and x ∈ RK ,
w+Q(x) = (v
+
Q)
♯(x), and v+Q(p) = (w
+
Q)
♭(p).
w−Q(x) = (v
−
Q)
♯(x), and v−Q(p) = (w
−
Q)
♭(p).
Note that the games G(π) and GQ(p) are identical whenever π = p ⊗Q (i.e. π
kℓ = pkQ(ℓ|k)
for all (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L). Together with the corollary in Section 2.1.3, this observation yields the
following result.
Corollary 2.6. Let π ∈ ∆(K × L) and let (p,Q) ∈ ∆(K) × ∆(L)K be such that π = p ⊗ Q.
Let x ∈ ∂+v+Q(p), and let tˆε ∈ T
L be an ε-optimal strategy of player 2 in D[GQ](x). Then, tˆε is
ε-optimal for player 2 in G(π).
Our model being symmetric (i.e. the players play the same role), one defines in the same
manner a dual game with respect to the second marginal of π and analogue results are obtained.
In the sequel, we will only work with the dual game with respect to the first marginal on π.
Thus, we will focus on the construction of optimal strategies for player 2.
3 Repeated games with incomplete information
Let K,L, I, J be finite sets. A repeated game with incomplete information is described by a
family of I × J-matrix games {Gkℓ, (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L} and a probability π ∈ ∆(K × L). A pair
of parameters (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L is drawn according to π ∈ ∆(K × L). Player 1 is informed of k,
player 2 is informed of ℓ. Then, the game Gkℓ is played repeatedly: the players choose actions
(im, jm) ∈ I × J at each stage m ≥ 1. We assume that the players observe and remember
the history of the play, hm = (i1, j1, . . . , im−1, jm−1). The set of possible histories at stage m is
Hm := (I×J)
m−1 and H := ∪m≥1Hm is the set of all possible (finite) histories. The information
available to player 1 (resp. 2) at stage m is (k, hm) (resp. (ℓ, hm)).
Definition 3.1 (Strategies). A strategy of player 1 (resp. 2) is a function sˆ : K × H → ∆(I)
(resp. tˆ : L×H → ∆(J)).
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By a slight abuse in the notation, the set of strategies are denoted, respectively, by SK
and TL. Let Pπ
sˆ,tˆ
be the unique probability distribution over K × L × (I × J)∞ induced by
π ∈ ∆(K × L) and (sˆ, tˆ) ∈ SK × TL. The payoff function in Gθ(π) is defined as follows:
∀(sˆ, tˆ) ∈ SK × TL, γθ(π, sˆ, tˆ) := E
π
sˆ,tˆ
[∑
m≥1
θmG
kℓ(im, jm)
]
,
where Eπ
sˆ,tˆ
is the expectation with respect to Pπ
sˆ,tˆ
. The maxmin and minmax of Γθ(π) are,
respectively:
v−θ (π) := sup
sˆ∈SK
inf
tˆ∈TL
γθ(π, sˆ, tˆ),
v+θ (π) := inf
tˆ∈TL
sup
sˆ∈SK
γθ(π, sˆ, tˆ).
The game Gθ(π) has a value if v
−
θ (π) = v
+
θ (π).
Lemma 3.2. For any π ∈ ∆(K × L), the game Gθ(π) has a value, denoted by vθ(π).
Proof. Fix ε > 0. Let mε be such that
∑
m≥mε
θm ≤ ε/‖G‖. Let ρθ,ε(π) be the value of the
finite game obtained by truncating the stream of payoffs at stage mε. Then, clearly,
|v−θ (π)− ρθ,ε(π)| ≤ ε, and |v
+
θ (π)− ρθ,ε(π)| ≤ ε, ∀π ∈ ∆(K × L).
Thus v+θ (π) ≤ v
−
θ (π) + 2ε, for all π ∈ ∆(K × L).
3.1 Recursive structure
At stage 1, the information of player 1 (resp. 2) is simply k (resp. ℓ). His strategy is denoted
by σ := sˆ(h1) ∈ ∆(I)
K (resp. τ := tˆ(h1) ∈ ∆(J)
L).
Definition 3.3. For any (i, j) ∈ I × J and sˆ ∈ SK define the continuation strategy sˆ+ij ∈ S
K
as follows:
sˆ+ij : H → ∆(I), h 7→ sˆ(i, j, h),
where for any h ∈ H, (i, j, h) denotes the history obtained by concatenating (i, j) and h.
Similarly, one defines continuation strategies tˆ+ij ∈ T
L for player 2. The weight of the re-
maining stages after stage 1 is
∑
m≥2 θm = 1 − θ1. If θ1 < 1, it is convenient to consider the
normalized evaluation θ+ ∈ ∆(N∗), defined as:
θ+m :=
θm+1
1− θ1
, m ≥ 1.
Let Pπσ,τ denote the unique probability measure on K × L × I × J induced by (σ, τ) ∈
∆(I)K ×∆(J)L and π ∈ ∆(K × L). Explicitly,
P
π
σ,τ (k, ℓ, i, j) = π
kℓσk(i)τ ℓ(j), ∀(k, ℓ, i, j) ∈ K × L× I × J.
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Let πij := P
π
σ,τ (·, ·|i, j) ∈ ∆(K×L) be the conditional probability on K×L, given (i, j) ∈ I×J .
It is defined arbitrarily if Pπσ,τ (i, j) = 0. Otherwise, for all (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L,
πkℓij =
πkℓσk(i)τ ℓ(j)∑
(k,ℓ)∈K×L π
kℓσk(i)τ ℓ(j)
.
Now, one can easily write a recursive formula for the payoff function, considering the first
stage and the continuation game separately:
γθ(π, sˆ, tˆ) = θ1G
π
στ + (1− θ1)
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
P
π
στ (i, j)γθ+(πij , sˆ
+
ij, tˆ
+
ij), (3.1)
where Gπστ := E
π
σ,τ [G
kℓ(i, j)] denotes the expected payoff at stage 1. By convention we put
γθ+ = 0 if θ1 = 1.
The following proposition is due to Mertens and Zamir [8, Section 3]. For convenience, we
provide here a direct and shorter proof.
Proposition 3.4 (Primal recursive formula). For any π ∈ ∆(K × L) and θ ∈ ∆(N∗):
vθ(π) = sup
σ∈∆(I)K
inf
τ∈∆(J)L

θ1Gπστ + (1− θ1)
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
P
π
στ (i, j)vθ+(πij)

 .
= inf
τ∈∆(J)L
sup
σ∈∆(I)K

θ1Gπστ + (1− θ1)
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
P
π
στ (i, j)vθ+(πij)

 .
Proof. Consider the maxmin. Let sˆ = (σ, sˆ+) ∈ SK be a strategy of player 1. Let tˆ+ be such that,
for each (i, j) ∈ I×J , tˆ+ij is a best reply to sˆ
+
ij in Gθ+(πij). Then, for all (σ, τ) ∈ ∆(I)
K×∆(J)L,
γθ
(
π, sˆ, tˆ
)
≤ θ1G
π
στ + (1− θ1)
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
P
π
στ (i, j)vθ+(πij).
Player 1 can still maximize over his own first-stage strategy. A best reply of player 2 yields
vθ(π) = sup
(σ,sˆ+)
inf
(τ,tˆ+)
γθ(π, sˆ, tˆ),
≤ max
σ∈∆(I)K
min
τ∈∆(J)L
{
θ1G
π
στ + (1− θ1)
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
P
π
στ (i, j)vθ+(πij)
}
.
Reversing the roles of the players one obtains, symmetrically:
vθ(π) ≥ min
τ∈∆(J)L
max
σ∈∆(I)K
{
θ1G
π
στ + (1− θ1)
∑
(i,j)∈I×J
P
π
στ (i, j)vθ+(πij)
}
, (3.2)
and the result follows then because maxmin ≤ minmax.
Comments Proposition 3.4 provides a recurrence formula satisfied by the values. However,
none of the players can “use it”, since the computation of the conditional probability πij involves
the strategy of his opponent. The situation contrasts with the case of repeated games with
incomplete information on one side (i.e. L is a singleton). In this case, player 1 can compute
(and controls) the conditional probabilities, so that this formula provides an explicit, recursive
way to construct optimal strategies for him (see [11, Section 3]).
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3.2 The dual game
Consider, for any (x,Q) ∈ RK × ∆(L)K , the first dual game D[Gθ](x,Q), i.e. the dual game
with respect to the first marginal of π. The set of strategies of player 1 (resp. 2) is ∆(K)× SK
(resp. TL) and, for any (p, sˆ, tˆ) ∈ ∆(K)× SK × TL, the payoff is given by
hθ[x,Q](p, sˆ, tˆ) = γθ
(
p⊗Q, sˆ, tˆ
)
− 〈p, x〉.
The maxmin and minmax are defined, respectively, as:
w−θ (x,Q) := sup
(p,sˆ)∈∆(K)×SK
inf
tˆ∈TL
hθ[x,Q](p, sˆ, tˆ),
w+θ (x,Q) := inf
tˆ∈TL
sup
(p,sˆ)∈∆(K)×SK
hθ[x,Q](p, sˆ, tˆ).
The existence of the value follows from Lemma 3.2 and Theorem 2.5.
Let (σ, τ) ∈ ∆(I)K ×∆(J)L be a pair of first-stage strategies. Let π ∈ ∆(K ×L), p ∈ ∆(K)
and Q ∈ ∆(L)K be such that π = p⊗Q. For any (i, k) ∈ I ×K, define
pki := P
π
σ,τ (k | i), (3.3)
Gk,Qiτ = E
π
σ,τ [G
kℓ(i, j) | k, i]. (3.4)
The corresponding vectors are denoted by pi ∈ ∆(K) and G
Q
iτ ∈ R
K , respectively. The former
is the posterior probability on K given i, the latter is the vector of expected payoffs for player
2, after he observes the action played by his opponent. Explicitly,
Gk,Qiτ =
∑
(ℓ,j)∈L×J
Q(ℓ|k)τ ℓ(j)Gkℓ(i, j).
As in (3.1), the following recurrence formula for the payoff function is straightforward:
hθ[x,Q]
(
p, sˆ, tˆ
)
= (1− θ1)
∑
i∈I
P
π
σ,τ (i)

∑
j∈J
P
π
σ,τ (j|i)γθ+
(
πij , sˆ
+
ij, tˆ
+
ij
)
−
〈
pi,
x− θ1G
Q
iτ
1− θ1
〉
 .
(3.5)
The conditional probabilities
Let us give here a closer look at the conditional probability πij = P
π
σ,τ (·, ·|i, j) ∈ ∆(K×L). The
next lemma provides a decomposition which will play a key role in the sequel.
Lemma 3.5. For any (i, j) such that Pπσ,τ (i, j) > 0, one can express πij as pij ⊗ Qj , where
pij ∈ ∆(K) and Qj ∈ ∆(L)
K are defined as follows:
pkij = p
k
i
P
π
σ,τ (j|k)
Pπσ,τ (j|i)
, ∀k ∈ K (3.6)
Qj(ℓ|k) =
Q(ℓ|k)τ ℓ(j)∑
ℓ′ Q(ℓ
′|k)τ ℓ′(j)
, ∀(k, ℓ) ∈ K × L. (3.7)
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Proof. Fix (i, j) ∈ I×J such that Pπσ,τ (i, j) > 0, and (k, ℓ) ∈ K×L. By disintegration, one has:
πkℓij = P
π
σ,τ (k|i, j)P
π
σ,τ (ℓ|k, i, j),
where Pπσ,τ (k|i, j) satisfies
P
π
σ,τ (k|i, j)P
π
σ,τ (j|i) = P
π
σ,τ (k|i)P
π
σ,τ (j|k, i).
Then (3.6) is obtained from (3.3) and from computing
P
π
σ,τ (j|k, i) =
pkσk(i)
∑
ℓ∈LQ(ℓ|k)τ
ℓ(j)
pkσk(i)
= Pπσ,τ (j|k).
On the other hand, a direct computation yields
P
π
σ,τ (ℓ|k, i, j) =
pkσk(i)Q(ℓ|k)τ ℓ(j)
pkσk(i)
∑
ℓ′∈LQ(ℓ
′|k)τ ℓ′(j)
= Qj(ℓ|k).
Comments
• An important consequence of Lemma 3.5 is the fact that player 2 can compute (and
controls) the matrix of conditional probabilities Qj ∈ ∆(L)
K , for all j ∈ J . Note also
that, for all k ∈ K, player 2 can compute
P
π
σ,τ (j|k) =
∑
ℓ∈L
Q(ℓ|k)τ ℓ(j).
The vector (Pπσ,τ (j|k))k∈K appears in the construction of optimal strategies for player 2
(see Proposition 3.7), allowing to adjust the payoff function in the continuation game.
• In the independent case (i.e. π = p ⊗ q, for some p ∈ ∆(K) and q ∈ ∆(L)) one simply
has πij = pi ⊗ qj, where for each ℓ ∈ L, q
ℓ
j =
qℓτℓ(j)
∑
ℓ′∈L q
ℓ′τℓ
′ (j)
(pi is defined similarly). As a
consequence, each player can compute and controls one of the marginals of πij, and the
payoffs need not be adjusted (see Section 3.5 for more details).
3.3 Main result
Here, we provide a recursive formula for the values of the dual game, by introducing an auxiliary
parameter ζ ∈ RK to the game. For each k ∈ K, ζk keeps track of some adjustments in
the payoff function, which allow to decompose the conditional probability distribution πij as
pi⊗Qj . The importance of such “separation of variables” will be clear in the proof of Theorem
(3.7). Surprisingly, these adjustments are specific to the general case (see Section 3.8 for the
independent case).
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3.3.1 The auxiliary game Gθ(π; ζ)
For any ζ ∈ RK , let Gθ(π; ζ) be the same game as Gθ(π), but with a slightly different payoff
function, given by
γθ(π, sˆ, tˆ; ζ) = E
π
sˆ,tˆ
[∑
m≥1
θmζ
kGkℓ(im, jm)
]
.
Note that Gθ(π;1) = Gθ(π), where 1 is the vector of 1’s in R
K .
The next result is quite technical, yet important. It states that, after an adequate adjustment
of the payoff function, the conditional probability πij can be expressed as pi ⊗Qj.
Lemma 3.6. Let π ∈ ∆(K × L). Let (σ, τ) ∈ ∆(I)K ×∆(J)L be a pair of first-stage strategies
and let (i, j) ∈ I×J be a pair of actions such that Pπσ,τ (i, j) > 0. Then, for any pair of strategies
(sˆ, tˆ) ∈ SK × TL and any evaluation θ ∈ ∆(N∗):
P
π
σ,τ (j|i)γθ
(
πij, sˆ, tˆ; ζ
)
= γθ
(
pi ⊗Qj , sˆ, tˆ; ζj
)
,
where for all k ∈ K, ζkj := ζ
k
P
π
σ,τ (j|k).
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 3.5 by a direct computation. Indeed, for any such (i, j) ∈
I × J one has:
P
π
σ,τ (j|i)γθ
(
πij, sˆ, tˆ; ζ
)
= Pπσ,τ (j|i)
∑
(k,ℓ)∈K×L
πkℓij Esˆk,tˆℓ

∑
m≥1
θmζ
kGkℓ(im, jm)

 ,
= Pπσ,τ (j|i)
∑
(k,ℓ)∈K×L
pki
P
π
σ,τ (j|k)
Pπσ,τ (j|i)
Qj(ℓ|k)Esˆk,tˆℓ

∑
m≥1
θmζ
kGkℓ(im, jm)

 ,
=
∑
(k,ℓ)∈K×L
pkiQj(ℓ|k)Esˆk,tˆℓ

∑
m≥1
θ+mP
π
σ,τ (j|k)ζ
kGkℓ(im, jm)

 ,
= γθ
(
pi ⊗Qj, sˆ, tˆ; ζj
)
.
We are now ready to state our main result, which is the following recursive formula for the
values of the auxiliary dual game D[Gθ](x,Q; ζ). Its importance relies on the fact that a) it allows
player 2 to construct optimal strategies recursively in the dual game, and b) these strategies are
optimal in the primal game Gθ(π), due to the duality results in Section 2.2.3, for an appropriate
choice of the parameters. The key point here is that player 2 can compute (xij, Qj ; ζj) and
θ+. This is of capital importance in order to construct an optimal strategy for this player (see
Section 3.4).
Theorem 3.7 (Dual recursive formula). For all (x,Q, ζ, θ) ∈ RK ×∆(L)K × RK ×∆(N∗),
wθ(x,Q; ζ) = (1− θ1) min
τ∈∆(J)L
min
(xij)ij∈(R
K)I×J
∀i,
∑
j xij=
x−θ1G
Q
iτ
1−θ1
max
i∈I
∑
j∈J
wθ+ (xij, Qj ; ζj) , (3.8)
where, for all (k, j) ∈ K × J , ζkj := ζ
k
P
π
σ,τ (j|k).
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Proof. We divide the proof in two parts, one for each inequality. Strategies sˆ ∈ SK and tˆ ∈ TL
are decomposed as sˆ = (σ, sˆ+) and tˆ = (τ, tˆ+) with no further mention.
Part 1: The ≥ inequality.
Knowing (p, σ) ∈ ∆(K) × ∆(I)K and τ ∈ ∆(J)L, player 1 can play, for each (i, j) ∈ I × J , a
best reply to tˆ+ij in game Gθ+(πij; ζj). Then, using the recursive formula for the payoff function,
given in (3.5):
hθ[x,Q]
(
p, sˆ, tˆ
)
≥ (1− θ1)
∑
i∈I
P
π
σ,τ (i)

∑
j∈J
P
π
σ,τ (j|i)vθ+ (πij ; ζ)−
〈
pi,
x− θ1G
Q
iτ
1− θ1
〉 . (3.9)
Lemma 3.6 implies then that, for any (i, j) ∈ I × J such that Pπσ,τ (i, j) > 0,
P
π
σ,τ (j|i)vθ+ (πij; ζ) = vθ+(pi ⊗Qj; ζj).
Clearly, Pπσ,τ (i, k) = p
kσk(i) is independent of player 2’s strategy. Disintegration gives p ⊗ σ =
α⊗µ ∈ ∆(K×I), where α := (p⊗σ)I ∈ ∆(I) and µ := (p⊗σ)K|I ∈ ∆(K)I . In fact, µ( · | i) = pi,
for all i ∈ I occurring with positive probability. Define
p′ ∈ ∆(K) 7→ fj(p
′) := vθ+
(
p′ ⊗Qj; ζj
)
. (3.10)
Let F :=
∑
j∈J fj. Taking the supremum in ∆(K × I) in (3.9) or, equivalently, in (α, µ) ∈
∆(I)×∆(K)I , yields, for all tˆ = (τ, tˆ+):
sup(p,σ) hθ[x,Q]
(
p, sˆ, tˆ
)
≥ (1− θ1) sup
α∈∆(I)
∑
i∈I
αi

 sup
pi∈∆(K)
∑
j∈J
fj(pi)−
〈
pi,
x− θ1G
Q
iτ
1− θ1
〉
 ,
= (1− θ1) sup
i∈I

 sup
pi∈∆(K)
∑
j∈J
fj(pi)−
〈
pi,
x− θ1G
Q
iτ
1− θ1
〉
 ,
= (1− θ1) sup
i∈I
F ♯
(
x− θ1G
Q
iτ
1− θ1
)
,
= (1− θ1) sup
i∈I
inf
(xj)j∈(RK)J
∑
j∈J xj=
x−θ1G
Q
iτ
1−θ1
∑
j∈J
f ♯j (xj).
The last equality is a obtained using a result on the Fenchel conjugates [10, Theorem 16.4]. It
relies on the concavity and properness of the functions fj, for all j ∈ J . Moreover, the infimum
is reached. The proof is left to the Appendix, at the end of this chapter. On the other hand,
for all j ∈ J ,
f ♯j (xj) = suppi∈∆(K) vθ+ (pi ⊗Qj; ζj)− 〈pi, xj〉, (by def.)
= wθ+ (xj, Qj ; ζj) , (by Theorem 2.5).
The ≥ inequality in (3.8) follows by taking the infimum in tˆ = (τ, tˆ+). To obtain (3.8), commute
the supremum and the infimum using that supa∈A infb∈B = inf(b(a))a∈BA supa∈A. We already
12
noticed that the infima are reached, the supremum is reached by finiteness.
Part 2: The ≤ inequality.
Let τ ∈ ∆(J)L and (xij)j ∈ (R
K)J be optimal in (3.8), for each i ∈ I. The infimum in τ is reached
by compactness and continuity. Let tˆ+ij be optimal in D[Gθ+ ](xij , Qj ; ζj) for each (i, j) ∈ I × J .
Then, by (3.5), and by the choice of (xij)j one has, for any strategy (p, σ, sˆ
+) = (α, µ, sˆ+) of
player 1,
hθ[x,Q]
(
p, sˆ, tˆ
)
= (1− θ1)
∑
i∈I
αi
∑
j∈J
γθ+
(
pi ⊗Qj, sˆ
+
ij , tˆ
+
ij ; ζj
)
−
〈
pi,
x− θ1G
Q
iτ
1− θ1
〉
,
≤ (1− θ1) sup
i∈I
∑
j∈J
(
γθ+(pi ⊗Qj , sˆ
+
ij, tˆ
+
ij ; ζj)− 〈pi, xij〉
)
,
≤ (1− θ1) sup
i∈I
∑
j∈J
wθ+(xij , Qj ; ζj),
≤ (1− θ1) inf
τ∈∆(J)L
sup
i∈I
inf
(xj)j∈(R
K )J
∑
j xj=
x−θ1G
Q
iτ
1−θ1
∑
j∈J
wθ+ (xj, Qj ; ζj) .
Thus, player 2 can ensure that the payoff in D[Gθ](x,Q, ζ) is smaller than the right-hand-side
of the last equation. The desired inequality follows.
Comments
• The recurrence formula implies, in particular, the following result. For any (x,Q, ζ, θ) ∈
R
K ×∆(L)K × RK ×∆(N∗),
wθ(x,Q) ≤ (1− θ1) min
τ¯∈∆(J)
max
i∈I
wθ+
(
x− θ1G
Q
iτ¯
1− θ1
, Q
)
. (3.11)
Let (τ, (xij)ij) be a minimizer in recurrence formula (3.8). Suppose that player 2’s strategy
is non-revealing, i.e. that there exists τ¯ ∈ ∆(J) such that τ ℓ(j) = τ¯(j), for all ℓ ∈ L. Then,
the convexity of wθ+( · , Q) yields:
wθ(x,Q) = (1− θ1)max
i∈I
wθ+
(
x− θ1G
Q
iτ
1− θ1
, Q
)
.
Conversely, if the equality holds in (3.11), then it is optimal for player 2 to play non-
revealing. It is enough to choose, in the recurrence formula, (τ, (xij)ij) such that τ
ℓ(j) =
τ¯(j), for all ℓ ∈ L, for some τ¯ ∈ ∆(J), and xij =
x−θ1G
Q
i,τ
1−θ1
, for all (i, j) ∈ I × J .
These particular cases were already pointed out by Cardaliaguet [2] and Cardaliaguet,
Laraki and Sorin [3] in the framework of continuous-time games with incomplete informa-
tion, in the independent case.
• The extra parameter ζ played a crucial role in the first part of the proof of Theorem 3.7.
The expression (3.10) allowed us to take the upper conjugate of the value function of the
continuation game, and thus obtain a lower bound on the payoff that player 1 can defend.
The introduction of an additional parameter is not necessary in the independent case, due
to the relation πij = pi ⊗ qj. We refer to [6] or Section 3.5 for more details.
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3.4 Markovian optimal strategies
In this section, we deduce from Theorem 3.7 and Corollary 2.6 the construction of optimal
strategies for player 2 in the game Gθ(π). These strategies are Markovian, in the sense that they
depend on the past history only through the present (of the appropriate variables).
Let (p,Q) ∈ ∆(K)×∆(L)K be such that π = p⊗Q. Define the mapping vθ( · , Q) : ∆(K)→ R
by setting vθ(p
′, Q) := vθ(p
′ ⊗ Q) for all p′ ∈ ∆(K). Set ζ := 1 ∈ RK and choose some x in
∂+vθ(p,Q).
We are now ready to describe, recursively, an optimal strategy for player 2 in Gθ(π).
- Let τ ∈ ∆(J)L and (xij)(i,j)∈I×J be optimal in (3.8) at (x,Q, ζ, θ).
- Choose j ∈ J with probability τ ℓ(j), where ℓ is player 2’s private type.
- Play optimally in D[Gθ+ ](xij , Qj ; ζj), where i ∈ I is player 1’s action at the first stage.
This strategy is optimal in D[Gθ](x,Q;1) = D[Gθ](x,Q), thanks to Theorem 3.7. By Corollary
2.6 and the choice of (x,Q), the strategy is also optimal in Gθ(π). At stage m, the strategy
depends only on the variables (xm, Qm, ζm), constructed recursively, and on the normalized
evaluation of the payoff. Explicitly, given the couple of actions (i, j) := (im, jm) at stage m,
(xm+1, Qm+1, ζm+1) := ((xm)ij , (Qm)j , (ζm)j).
Alternatively, given his own actions (j1, . . . , jm), player 2 can use the following explicit ex-
pression:
ζkm =
∑
ℓ∈L
Q(ℓ|k)
m∏
n=1
τ ℓn(jn), ∀k ∈ K, ∀m ≥ 1,
where τn ∈ ∆(J)
L is his strategy at stage n. Note also that, for any (k, ℓ) ∈ K × L,
Qm(ℓ|k) = P
π
sˆ,tˆ
(ℓ | k, hm).
3.5 The independent case
The aim of this section is to deduce, from Theorem 3.7 the recursive formula for the independent
case established by De Meyer and Marino [6]. In particular, we show that the auxiliary variable
is not necessary. Let π = p⊗ q be a product measure, for some p ∈ ∆(K) and q ∈ ∆(L). This is
equivalent to saying that the private parameters k and ℓ are chosen independently. Let Gθ(p, q)
and Gθ(p, q; ζ) stand, respectively, for Gθ(π) and Gθ(π; ζ) in this case. Let P
p,q
σ,τ denote the unique
probability in K × L× I × J induced by (σ, τ, p, q).
Corollary 3.8. For any (θ, x, q) ∈ ∆(N∗)× RK ×∆(L):
wθ(x, q) = (1− θ1) min
τ∈∆(J)L
min
(xij)ij∈(R
K)I×J
∀i,
∑
j τ¯(j)xij=
x−θ1G
q
iτ
1−θ1
max
i∈I
∑
j∈J
τ¯(j)wθ+ (xij, qj) , (3.12)
where τ¯ is the marginal of q⊗ τ on ∆(J), qj is its conditional on L given j and G
q
iτ is the vector
of expected payoffs, given k ∈ K.
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Proof. By Proposition 3.7, for any ζ ∈ RK
wθ(x, q; ζ) = (1− θ1) min
τ∈∆(J)L
min
(xij)ij∈(RK )I×J
∀i,
∑
j xj=
x−θ1G
q
iτ
1−θ1
max
i∈I
∑
j∈J
wθ+ (xij, qj ; ζj) ,
where ζkj = P
p,q
σ,τ (j|k)ζk, for all (j, k) ∈ J ×K. Clearly, P
p,q
σ,τ (j|k) =
∑
ℓ∈L q
ℓτ ℓ(j) = τ¯(j), so that
ζj = τ¯(j)ζ, for all j ∈ J . Therefore, for all j,
vθ(p, q; ζj) = τ¯(j)vθ(p, q; ζ). (3.13)
The following property of the conjugate is straightforward:
∀f : ∆(K)→ R, ∀α ∈ R\{0}, ∀x ∈ RK , (αf)♯(x) = αf ♯
(x
α
)
, (3.14)
It follows from (3.13) and (3.14) that, for any j ∈ J such that τ¯(j) > 0, one has
wθ+(xij , qj , ζj) = τ¯(j)wθ+
(
xij
τ¯(j)
, qj ; ζ
)
.
The result follows then by a simple change of variables, yij :=
xij
τ¯(j) , and taking ζ = 1.
4 Extensions, open problems
4.1 Infinite set of actions
The recursive formula satisfied by the values of the dual game was proved by De Meyer and
Marino [6] in the more general framework of infinite actions spaces I, J , finite sets K,L and a
bounded, measurable payoff function – in the independent case. In order to avoid measurability
issues, we did not address this problem in the present work. However, we think that such an
extension is possible for general initial probabilities assuming, for example, that I, J are Polish
spaces equipped with their Borel σ-algebras. In order to adapt our proof to this more general
framework, one probably needs to prove the existence of measurable selections of ε-best replies
and then use Theorem 5.3 in [6] to extend Theorem 6.1 (in the Appendix) to integrals instead
of finite sums.
4.2 Optimal strategies in differential games with incomplete information
Differential games with incomplete information were introduced by Cardaliaguet [2]. As in
repeated games with incomplete information, before the game starts, a pair of parameters (k, ℓ)
is drawn according to some commonly known probability distribution π on K × L. Player 1
is informed of k and player 2 of ℓ. Then, a differential game is played in which the dynamic
and the payoff function depend on both types: each player is thus partially informed about the
differential game that is played. The existence and characterisation of the value function was
established by Cardaliaguet [2] in the independent case, and extended to the general case by
the second author [9]. The proof relies on the geometry of the value function (I-concavity and
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II-convexity) and on a sub-dynamic programming principle satisfied by its Fenchel conjugate
(i.e. the value of the dual game), in the spirit of (3.11).
The construction of optimal strategies remains, however, an open problem. Equivalently, one
may seek to establish a dynamic programming principle satisfied by the value function of the
dual game, as in Theorem 2.5.
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6 Appendix
A result from convex analysis
Theorem 6.1 ([10], Theorem 16.4). For any j ∈ J , let fj be a concave, bounded, real function
on ∆(K). Let F :=
∑
j fj. Then, for any z ∈ R
K :
F ♯(z) = min
(xj)j∈(RK )J∑
j xj=z
∑
j∈J
f ♯j (xj).
Proof. For any (µ, xj) ∈ ∆(K)×R
K , the inequality fj(µ)− 〈µ, xj〉 ≤ f
♯
j (xj) holds. Summation
on j ∈ J yields that, for any (xj)j ∈ (R
K)J such that
∑
j xj = z,
F (µ)− 〈µ, z〉 ≤
∑
j∈J
f ♯j (xj).
Taking the supremum in µ (on the left-hand side), and the infimum in (xj)j ∈ (R
K)J such that∑
j xj = z (on the right-hand-side) one has:
F ♯(z) ≤ inf
(xj)j∈(RK)J∑
j xj=z
∑
j∈J
f ♯j (xj).
Conversely, let µ♯ ∈ ∆(K) be such that F ♯(z) =
∑
j∈J fj(µ
♯)−〈µ♯, z〉. Then, z ∈ ∂+F (µ♯). The
boundedness of the fj’s implies [10, Theorem 23.8] that ∂
+F =
∑
j∈J ∂
+fj. Let (x
♯
j)j∈J ∈ (R
K)J
be such that
∑
j∈J x
♯
j = z and x
♯
j ∈ ∂
+fj(µ
♯), for all j ∈ J . Then,
fj(µ
♯)− 〈µ♯, x♯j〉 = f
♯
j (x
♯
j), ∀j ∈ J.
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Summation yields then:
F ♯(z) =
∑
j∈J
fj(µ
♯)− 〈µ♯, z〉 =
∑
j∈J
f ♯j (x
♯
j).
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